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Abstract
This paper examines how consolidation in the marketing system affects prices for orange juice. We
isolated the pricing behavior of brand marketers, wholesalers, and retailers by observing the retail
prices for specific orange juice products, including leading national brands and private label brands,
in 54 U.S. markets over a 1-year period. The data provided little compelling evidence that consoli-
dated markets engaged in non-competitive pricing behavior. Increased brand competition, particularly
between private labels and leading national brands, did, however, appear to lower average market
prices.
Keywords
Consumer demographics, national brands, orange juice, price behavior, private labels, wholesaler 
concentration, retailer concentration.
Introduction
In the United States, no single orange
grower produces enough product to
influence the price he or she receives in
the market, nor does any group of con-
sumers purchase enough product to influ-
ence the price they pay. However,
between those two endpoints in the mar-
keting system, the processing, packaging,
and distribution stages of the orange
juice supply chain have become increas-
ingly concentrated, with several compa-
nies controlling large shares of the
orange juice market at different stages
along the supply chain. When a firm
becomes very large, it may be able to
exercise an influence on market prices
(Weiss). When this happens, it gains at
the expense of growers and consumers.
On the other hand, firms are motivated to
grow in part so they can realize potential
cost savings that often come with
increasing the size and/or scope of pro-
duction. When firms achieve cost savings
through expansion, they are often able to
offer their products at lower prices than
their smaller competitors (Alchian and
Demsetz). This may lead to obtaining
higher market shares and eventual con-
centration of industries participating in
particular market segments. With these
two forces in play, we examined market
data within the highly concentrated
orange juice marketing system to discern
if noncompetitive or price-reducing
behaviors are more evident in the
observed prices.
To understand the effects of industry
concentration, one can observe a market
over time or observe many different mar-
kets at some point in time. This paper
presents analysis of the latter type, focus-
ing on specific orange juice product mar-
ket prices across 54 U.S. grocery market-
ing areas (table 1) over a 52-week period,
November 4, 1989, to November 2,
1990. There are a number of advantages
to this approach. Regional markets in
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sibility of the authors.1990 exhibited wide variability in whole-
sale-retail consolidation. Many grocery
marketing areas had four-firm concentra-
tion ratios2 (CR-4) near or above 90 per-
cent in both the wholesale and retail
stages of the grocery marketing system.
Many other marketing areas had CR-4
ratios around or below 50 percent at the
wholesale and/or retailing stages.
Another advantage to working with this
period is that it encompasses the time
before, during, and after a severe nega-
tive supply shock in the Florida orange
crop, brought on by the December 1989
orange freeze. For one to observe price
behavior, prices must change, and in this
period, retail prices went from their 1989
low point to the highest levels attained in
the 1990s, and eventually back down
again. How individual brand prices
change in such conditions can say a lot
about the competitive behavior in the
industry.
A third advantage to the 1989/90 time
period is that it affords the use of a
unique data resource that has since been
discontinued. Data for this analysis
comes from Selling-Areas Markets, Inc.
(SAMI), a grocery-marketing research
firm that ceased operations in December
1990, at which time much of its data
resources were donated to Purdue Uni-
versity. Information contained in this
data set includes complete shipping logs
from grocery-shipping warehouses serv-
ing supermarkets in 54 distinct grocery
marketing areas (GMAs) whose total
sales represented around 85 percent of
U.S. supermarket sales. Log entries
included shipments and average unit
prices, in continuous 4-week intervals, of
specific grocery items sold in each mar-
ket area. This study uses summaries of
these data for average prices over four
approximately 3-month quarters ending
November 2, 1990. The prices are for
two frozen concentrate national brand
products, two refrigerated national brand
products,3 and an average price for all
private label products, one frozen con-
centrate average and one refrigerated
average. Also used for this analysis is the
market share that each brand (including
the combined private label brands) con-
trols within each market.
This study could not be replicated with
more recent data. After 1990, no other
data source with comparable market cov-
erage is available that keeps track of gro-
cery product shipments from wholesalers
to retailers.
The price analysis presented below for
the six orange juice products takes into
account such factors as wholesale and
retail concentration, private label market
shares, per-capita income of consumers
in each GMA, and shipping distances. 
Price Analysis
By 1997, the average Florida orange
grove was 40 percent larger than in 1987
(1997 Census of Agriculture). Florida
orange juice processing firms totaled 27
in the 1989-90 season, while only 18
firms processed orange juice in Florida
in the 2000-01 season (Spreen and Fer-
nandes). About half of all processed
orange juice produced in Florida is
branded by the two leading national
orange juice marketing processors
(Hardy). About half of all groceries pur-
chased in supermarkets nationwide were
purchased from the 20 largest grocery
chains—this represents an increase of
about a third in the 20-firm supermarket
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2The four-firm concentration ratio measures the
share of total sales within a well-defined mar-
ket going to the four largest companies operat-
ing in that market, for example grocery sales in
the wholesale or retail segment of the Balti-
more, MD grocery marketing area.
3The four national brand products examined
were each sold in all 54 marketing areas, while
the two private label categories examined rep-
resent average prices of all private label FCOJ
and from concentrate refrigerated orange juice
respectively, sold within each GMA.
Table 1—Grocery Marketing Areas  
East Midwest  South  West   
Albany, NY  Scranton, PA  Charleston, WV  Milwaukee, WI  Atlanta, GA  Memphis, TN  Denver, CO
Baltimore, MD  Syracuse, NY  Chicago, IL  Minneapolis, MN  Birmingham, AL  Miami, FL  El Paso, TX
Boston, MA   Cincinnati, OH  Oklahoma City, OK  Charleston, SC  Nashville, TN  Los Angeles, CA
Buffalo, NY Cleveland, OH  Omaha, NE  Charlotte, NC  New Orleans, LA  Phoenix, AZ  
Hartford, CT   Detroit, MI  Peoria, IL  Dallas, TX  Norfolk, VA  Portland, OR
New York, NY   Grand Rapids, MI  Quad Cities, IL  Greenville, SC  Raleigh, NC  Salt Lake City, UT
Philadelphia, PA   Green Bay, WI  St. Louis, MO  Houston, TX  San Antonio, TX  San Francisco, CA  
Pittsburgh, PA   Indianapolis, IN  Wichita, KS  Jacksonville, FL  Shreveport, LA  Seattle, WA  
Portland, ME   Kansas City, MO   Louisville, KY   Spokane, WA  
This study could not be
replicated with more recent
data. After 1990, no other data
source with comparable
market coverage is available
that keeps track of grocery
product shipments from
wholesalers to retailers.share since the early 1990s. Between the
marketing processors/packagers and
retailers, grocery wholesalers have also
become far more consolidated since 1990.
Working backwards from retailing to
branding, a closer look is taken at local
market pricing behavior, both in markets
more advanced in this trend toward con-
solidation and in markets far less so.
Retail orange juice prices tend to vary by
form (e.g., FCOJ, NFC, and RECON—
see box), by brand and private label, by
season (reflecting uneven supply condi-
tions over time), by shipping distance
from primary producing regions (e.g.,
shipping distance from Florida), by prod-
uct attributes (e.g., calcium and pulp
content), and by socioeconomic attrib-
utes of the consumer (e.g., average
household income in the market area).
We took the following steps in this
analysis to minimize the confusion
caused by these factors in our ability to
explain observed retail prices. 
• First, specific national brand products
are examined, both over time and
across markets, for example, a line of
FCOJ of a specific brand name, size,
and type of container. For the private
label products, the specificity may
vary by region. 
• Second, price observations are sepa-
rated into four approximately equal
time periods spanning 1 year. 
• Finally, retail prices are isolated and
examined in markets exhibiting
extreme values (e.g., high versus low)
for six market characteristics that are
believed to affect price: retail concen-
tration, wholesale concentration, ver-
tical integration, brand competition,
price discrimination, and transporta-
tion. The purpose is to determine, for
each of these market indicators, if
price outcomes are distinguishable in
markets on opposite ends of the spec-
trum of outcomes.
Data from the 54 grocery marketing
areas span the 48 contiguous States and
are also dispersed in terms of the organi-
zation of the marketing systems operat-
ing in each area. This fact allowed for
price comparisons of specific products
and in specific time periods between
subsets of the 54 markets. For example,
consider two grocery marketing areas,
one served by a few large grocery chain
retailers and the other served by many
smaller independent retailers. If substan-
tial cost-saving benefits or diminished
competition benefits are available to
large grocery store chains that control
most of a market area, it is reasonable
that that would be evident in a price
comparison of the two marketing areas.
Rather than comparing two markets, we
compared prices between two groups of
10 markets. For each comparison, the
groups are denoted as the “high” group
and the “low” group, where the high
group represents the 10 markets with the
highest levels of the market characteris-
tic in the grouping criterion and the low
group the 10 markets with the lowest
levels in the criterion. Table 2 summa-
rizes the average, maximum, and mini-
mum values of the high and low groups
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Definitions
Not From Concentrate (NFC)— Juice that is flash-heated to pasteurize it immedi-
ately after the fruit is squeezed.
From Concentrate (RECON)—Juice manufactured as a frozen concentrate, then
reconstituted by adding back the amount of water originally removed.
Frozen Concentrate (FCOJ)— Freshly squeezed juice that has been concentrated
and frozen. Consumers reconstitute the juice by adding back the amount of water
originally removed.  
Source: Florida Department of Citrus.
Table 2—Summary statistics of market indicators        
Criteria Indicator  Group  Units  Average  Minimum  Maximum
Retail  consolidation  Four-firm  high  percent  80.3 75.3 86.3
concentration  ratio  low  percent  56.6 48.6 62.2
Wholesale  consolidation  Four-firm  high  percent  83.6 79.0 97.0 
concentration  ratio  low  percent  51.9 42.0 60.0 
Vertical integration  Warehouse capacity shares  high  percent  75.1  69.0  84.0
of integrated retailers  low  percent  21.9  0.1  31.5 
Brand competition  Private label  high  percent  38.7  32.0  50.4
market  share  low  percent  16.1 10.8 19.5
Price discrimination  Per-capita income  high  dollars  16,930   15,978   18,945
in marketing area  low  dollars  11,027   9,971   11,763
Transportation cost margins  Distance from  high  miles  2,022   1,310   2,553
central Florida  low  miles  409   127   615 4
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In 1990, grocery sales by the four largest
grocery chains operating in a single
SAMI grocery marketing area accounted
for, on average, just under 70 percent of
that area’s grocery sales.4 In some
regions, the four largest grocery chains
served over 85 percent of the retail mar-
ket in their area, while in other areas,
less than half the market was served by
the four largest chains (Metro Market
Studies). With such wide variation in
retail concentration of local marketing
areas, we grouped the data into the 10
markets with the highest concentration of
larger grocery chains and the 10 markets
with the lowest concentration, then com-
pared prices between the two groups.
The results of that grouping are shown in
figure 1. Average price data for six
orange juice products are presented for
both the group of low-retail-concentra-
tion markets and the group of high-retail-
concentration markets. Prices are
reported as averages for four 3-month
periods beginning November 4, 1989.5
The six products include three FCOJ
products and three refrigerated products,
and the figure groups the frozen and
refrigerated products in two separate
graphs. Brand 1 and Brand 2 of the
frozen products are specific basic leading
national brand frozen concentrate prod-
ucts—that is, they are the exact same
product in every marketing area.  The
private label represents, not a specific
product, but the average price across all
private label or store brand FCOJ prod-
ucts sold within a specific GMA. For the
refrigerated products, one brand is a spe-
cific refrigerated product from concen-
trate, the other is a specific not-from-
concentrate product, and the private label
product represents the average price of
all private label refrigerated from-con-
centrate products within a specific GMA.
So one might more easily compare rela-
tive prices between groups of markets,
for example “low” versus “high,” the fig-
ures show prices in all quarters for both
the low and high groupings as a ratio of
the first-quarter price of the product in
the low grouping of markets. For each of
the six products, we denote the Q1 price
of the low grouping as the “base price,”
so that the first of eight price bars pre-
sented for each product (prices in four
quarters for two market groupings)
always has a value of 1, since the first-
quarter low market price is divided by
itself. All other price bars in each group
of eight reflect the price in a particular
quarter (Q1 to Q4) relative to the base
price.
For example, in figure 1, the Q1 price of
Brand 1 in the high-concentration group
had a value of 0.95, while the Q3 price
in the low-concentration group had a
value of about 1.2. These indicate that
the Q1 price in the high-concentration
group for Brand 1 was 5 percent lower
than the base price, and that the Q3 price
in the low-concentration group was about
20 percent higher than the base price.
The first graph in figure 1 depicts the
four quarterly average prices for frozen
products. This graph shows that for all
three products, average first-quarter
prices were lower (by as much as 10 per-
cent for private label products) in the
group of markets with a high degree of
retail chain concentration. While prices
in the subsequent three quarters gener-
ally went up and then down (reflecting
the effects of the December 1989 freeze),
prices for each of the three products
were generally higher in the markets with
low retailer concentration than in the













Private label Brand 2 Brand 1 Private label Brand 2 Brand 1
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Figure 1
Retailer concentration and orange juice prices
Percent of "low" Q1 price
Quarterly market prices of orange juice for period ending November 2, 1990
Frozen concentrate Refrigerated
10 markets with high retailer concentrations 10 markets with low retailer concentrations
5‘Quarters’ Q1 to Q3 represent 12-week inter-
vals beginning Nov. 4, 1989, while Q4 is a 16-
week interval ending Nov. 2, 1990.
4The four largest chains within a grocery mar-
keting area are generally a different group of
four in each of the 54 market areas.The other graph in figure 1 depicts the
same information for the three refriger-
ated products. The story is much the
same, with the exception that the first-
quarter price of Brand 1 was about the
same in both the low- and high-concen-
tration markets. For all other products
and quarters, the six orange juice prod-
ucts were consistently priced lower in
markets with high retailer concentration.
Each of these results is consistent with
an interpretation that retailer concentra-
tion produces cost savings that can be
passed on to consumers.
...As Did Wholesaler
Concentration 
Grocery wholesalers purchase orange
juice from marketing processors and
other packagers, and distribute this juice
to multiple retailer outlets (see box). In
the SAMI data, all the products sold by
retailers within a grocery marketing area
were distributed to the retailers by
wholesalers, or from warehouses of inte-
grated retailers, with operations inside
the grocery marketing area, as this is
largely how these marketing areas were
defined (Connor). On average in 1990,
69 percent of the grocery wholesale busi-
ness within a grocery marketing area was
served by the four largest grocery whole-
salers operating in the area. In some
regions, the four largest grocery whole-
salers supplied over 95 percent of the
grocery market in their area, while in
other marketing areas as little as 42 per-
cent of the area’s grocery products
passed through the area’s four largest
wholesalers.
Figure 2 shows orange juice prices in
areas of high and low wholesaler con-
centration:  the “low” group reflects the
10 marketing areas with the lowest con-
centration of wholesalers and the “high”
group reflects the 10 marketing areas
with the highest concentration of whole-
salers. For the frozen products, the find-
ings nearly replicate those shown in fig-
ure 1. This synchronicity indicates that
orange juice markets where wholesaling
is highly concentrated exhibit pricing
behavior (at least for FCOJ) similar to
markets where retailing is highly concen-
trated.
For the refrigerated products, however,
orange juice prices showed no tendency
to be higher in either market. For exam-
ple, Brand 1 was priced higher in all four
quarters in the high-concentration group,
while Brand 2 was priced lower in those
markets. For private label brands, the
price was higher in the high-concentra-
tion markets in the first two quarters and
lower in the last two quarters. A closer
look at the price data for the refrigerated
products shows that for all three brands,
the highest percentage price increases
occurred in the low-concentration mar-
ket. Taken collectively, the results in fig-
ure 2 suggest, but not as strongly as for
retailing, that markets more concentrated
in grocery wholesaling tend to have
lower prices than less concentrated mar-
kets. There was a considerable shift in
consumer preferences toward the con-
sumption of refrigerated juices (particu-
larly NFC) taking place in this period
(Brown et al.), so it is not surprising that
price behaviors are hard to discern.
...And Integrated Retailers 
The consolidation of both the retail and
wholesale segments of the orange juice
marketing system is not coincidental.
Many analysts have argued that retail
consolidation is the driving force behind
wholesale consolidation. Among the rea-
sons for this, Connors notes that large
grocery retailers find backwards integra-
tion into warehousing and distribution
cost effective because it (i) permits a
more frequent and timely delivery sched-
ule; (ii) allows for a more precise stock
mix that better matches the preferences
of the retail chain’s customer base; (iii)
allows for warehouse expansion in loca-
tions that more closely follow the retail
chain’s expansion; (iv) ensures compati-
bility of electronic inventory-ordering
systems; and (v) is a strategic tool that
deters new entrants in marketing areas
where the chain has large sunk costs
and/or excess capacity and also deters
weaker competitors in the market from
aggressive pricing strategies.
These arguments again point to both effi-
ciency and anti-competitive forces as
motivating consolidation of the market-
ing system. A slightly more refined
analysis of orange juice pricing behavior
would combine the forces of consolida-
tion at the retail and wholesale segments
of the supply chain. This analysis is sum-
marized in figure 3, where quarterly
prices of the six products are compared
in markets with the 10 highest and the 10
lowest concentrations of integrated
retailers. Recall that figure 1 demon-
strated a pronounced negative relation-
ship between retail orange juice prices
and retail concentration while figure 2
indicated this relationship was less pro-
nounced when applied to wholesaler
consolidation. Figure 3 strengthens the
argument that warehouse consolidation is
more efficient and leads to lower retail
prices when it is integrated with retail
consolidation. Specifically, note in figure
3 that the first-quarter retail prices of all
six orange juice products examined were
lower, by as much as 11 percent, in mar-
kets with higher shares of warehouse
space controlled by integrated retailers.
Prices in the fourth quarter (Q4), which
generally reflected the full effects of the
price spike caused by the Florida orange
freeze and in most cases showed a return
toward pre-freeze price levels, were also
lower for all but the refrigerated private
label product. These findings probably
stem from the retail consolidation in 1990
occurring in conjunction with vertical
integration, with subsequent cost savings
being passed on in the retail markets
where these structural shifts were taking
place.
Private Labels Likewise Help
To Lower OJ Prices  
Within the Florida market, there were 27
citrus processors operating in the 1989-
90 growing season.  For the retail mar-
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These findings probably stem
from the retail consolidation in
1990 occurring in conjunction
with vertical integration, with
subsequent cost savings being
passed on in the retail markets
where these structural shifts
were taking place.ket, what was not produced by or sold to
the national brand marketers was pack-
aged and sold under numerous regional
brand names and private labels. While
private label orange juice brands are not
nationally marketed under a single brand
name, one or several private label brands
are available in every GMA. For exam-
ple, a single bulk processor may produce
an orange juice product that is marketed
by several grocery chains under different
brand logos. Another way a processor’s
product is marketed is under a regional
brand logo. These products have a lim-
ited distribution area, possibly spanning
6
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Florida typically accounts for more
than 90 percent of U.S. orange juice
production (USDA, 2000a). However,
in the 1989/90 freeze year, Florida pro-
duced only 85 percent of the domestic
orange juice supply, with Arizona,
Texas, and California providing the bal-
ance. In addition to domestic produc-
tion, imports are also an important
source of supply.  Brazil and Mexico
are the major exporters to the United
States (USDA, 2000b). Between 1989
and 1991, Brazil accounted for approxi-
mately 85 percent of U.S. frozen
imports (which are either sold domesti-
cally as frozen or reconstituted and sold
as chilled), while Mexico was the
source of nearly all premium chilled
orange juice. Frozen concentrate
accounts for approximately 98 percent
of total orange juice imports with not-
from-concentrate making up the
remaining 2 percent.
Processing and Packaging. In Florida,
around 95 percent of orange production
is purchased by orange processors
(USDA, 2000b). The juice is either pas-
teurized immediately (NFC) or
processed into FCOJ. There are two
types of orange processors: bulk
processors and marketing processors.
Bulk processors produce most of the
world’s orange juice. Marketing proces-
sors sell packaged juice under their
own brand name and they often also
purchase additional juice from bulk
processors.
Juice packers purchase bulk product,
package it, and, in most cases, distrib-
ute the packaged product. Some juice
packers pack and market their own
brands, while most pack for private
labels. Other participants that may han-
dle orange juice are blending houses,
typically located in port cities. Blend-
ing houses blend concentrates from dif-
ferent sources and with different quality
attributes in order to match customer
specifications. For such blends, buyers
pay a higher price for a product that
consistently meets their standards.
Most orange juice is transported in the
form of bulk FCOJ to packing plants
throughout the United States, since
shipping volumes are 5-6 times smaller
with concentrate than with reconsti-
tuted juice. Before packaging in the
familiar cylindrical package, filtered
water is added to the concentrate to
bring the brix, a measure of concentra-
tion of solids, down to three times the
concentration level of fresh juices. In
order to bring the FCOJ to the concen-
tration level of fresh orange juice, three
parts water must be added by the con-
sumer. For reconstituted juices, filtered
water is added to return the brix to the
average of fresh squeezed juice. It is
then packaged in cardboard cartons,
glass, or plastic jugs and sold at retail
stores.
Most NFC is packaged at fruit-process-
ing sites and transported in final form.
Limited amounts of bulk not-from-con-
centrate are also transported by road
and rail tanker to other parts of the
country for packaging.
Storage. Bulk frozen concentrate can
be stored for several years, provided
the temperature is kept at acceptable
levels. NFC can be stored two ways,
frozen or chilled. Each of these storage
methods allows NFC to be stored for at
least a year, a necessity as juice har-
vested from different times of the sea-
son are blended to obtain consistent
quality the whole year through.  NFC
in retail packaging has a shelf life of
approximately 63 days. 
Nearly all production is stored is in the
South Atlantic region and is distributed
throughout the country to meet
demand. FCOJ stocks are highly sea-
sonal as stocks are at their lowest in
November, at which time production
begins anew, and peaks in May, when
the last of the Valencia crop has been
harvested.
Distribution. Nearly all orange juice
distribution for retail sales follows one
of three paths: 1) delivery through
wholesalers, 2) delivery through retail-
ers, and 3) delivery directly to the retail
store. In the case of delivery through
wholesalers, the advantage for the
packers is that they make only one
transaction, as opposed to dealing with
a number of individual stores. Also, the
producer is more likely to gain wider
distribution of the product. Retailers
have also taken over the wholesale
function. In this situation, producers
reduce transactions, yet distribution
across various retailers may require
processors to work with a larger num-
ber of wholesale distributors. These
first two paths are common for frozen,
while the third, direct shipment to the
retailer, is more common with chilled
products.
Consumer Preferences. The last
decade has seen a large swing in con-
sumer demand from frozen orange
juice toward refrigerated and, espe-
cially, not-from-concentrate juices. The
1990 season was the first year in which
chilled orange juice outsold frozen con-
centrate, and the gap has consistently
widened since that time. Refrigerated
orange juice is made from concentrate,
except for those designated “premium”
which are made from fresh oranges and
never concentrated. The refrigerated
type is more important in terms of sales
than are frozen.
Orange Juice Industry Overviewseveral adjacent GMAs. Of the three dif-
ferent kinds of branding, only the leading
national brands engage in extensive
national promotional activities, which
can involve tens of millions of dollars
for a single advertising campaign
(Hardy). In 1990, the highest market
share for a leading national brand in a
single GMA was 38 percent (based on
warehouse shipments to supermarkets
within each GMA), while the highest
combined market share for private labels
was 47 percent.6 Variations on these
shares were large across the different
markets.
Among the most notable trends related to
brand competition over the 1990s was
the continued growth in market share of
private label orange juice brands. For
example, in the frozen juice category for
the 52-week period ending January 2000,
32 percent of sales in supermarkets were
for private label brands, up from 30 per-
cent in the previous year (PLMA’s 2000
Private Label Yearbook). Also, specific
private label brands from the largest gro-
cery retailers are likely to be taking mar-
7
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Private label Brand 2 Brand 1 Private label Brand 2 Brand 1
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Figure 3
Integrated retailers and orange juice prices
Percent of "low" Q1 price
Quarterly market prices of orange juice for period ending November 2, 1990
Frozen concentrate Refrigerated













Private label Brand 2 Brand 1 Private label Brand 2 Brand 1
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Figure 2
Wholesaler concentration and orange juice prices
Percent of "low" Q1 price
Quarterly market prices of orange juice for period ending November 2, 1990
Frozen concentrate














6 By way of example, the market share for the
Brand 1 refrigerated product reflects the gal-
lons of all variants of this brand of refrigerated
orange juice shipped to a GMA, divided by
total gallons of all orange juice shipped to this
GMA, including FCOJ shipments. FCOJ ship-
ments are converted to their fresh equivalent
volume.ket shares away from other private label
brands. In the GMAs covered in this
study for 1990, private label market
shares were as high as 32 percent for
refrigerated products and 47 percent for
FCOJ; averages were much lower—20
percent for frozen products and 11 per-
cent for refrigerated products. This varia-
tion affords the opportunity to compare
orange juice prices in GMAs with both
high and low private label market shares.
Figure 4 depicts the markets with the 10
highest private label market shares and
the markets with the 10 lowest shares.
For both the frozen and refrigerated
products, the first-quarter price was
always lower in markets with high pri-
vate label market shares, particularly for
the refrigerated products. But after the
effects of the freeze (a negative supply
shock) drove prices of orange juice up,
the prices of most products went up
faster in markets where private label
shares were high. While this may suggest
a mixed result, it is consistent with a sce-
nario whereby the existence of a large
private label market share brings the
price of the leading national brands
down. When the negative supply shock
hit, processors passed the full cost on to
their customers in the markets with high
private label shares since their price/cost
margins in these markets were already
low. Another result that stands out in the
figure for the refrigerated products is the
large gap between markets with high and
low private label shares for average first-
quarter prices of both national brands. In
subsequent quarters, the price of refriger-
ated orange juice changed little in mar-
kets with low private label market
shares, while the price increased notice-
ably in the markets with high private
label shares. These findings are com-
pelling evidence that national brand
orange juice processors are very respon-
sive to private label competition in
regional markets.
High-Income Areas Have
High OJ Prices  
Another way companies exercise market
power is through segmentation of the
consumer market, by charging different
prices to different segments of con-
sumers. With the data used here, it is not
easy to discern at which level of the sup-
ply chain such pricing behavior origi-
nates, but prices are available in markets
that have clearly distinguishable con-
sumer characteristics. Our approach was
to determine if average household
income within a specific market affected
the market price of orange juice.
For frozen products, prices started higher
and remained so throughout the year in
markets where household incomes were
high (fig. 5). For refrigerated products,
no distinct pattern appeared. A closer
look at the data reveals that for five of
the six products, the highest percentage
increases in price occurred in markets
with high household incomes. While a
number of possible explanations can be
offered, we simply note that the results
from this experiment suggest there may
be some tendency toward higher con-
sumer orange juice prices in areas with
high household incomes.
Areas Distant from Florida
Have Higher OJ Prices  
Even when regional orange juice supply
channels are otherwise indistinguishable
in different marketing areas, it is still
possible to observe retail price variations
caused by differences in shipping costs.
This scenario is especially relevant to
U.S. orange juice markets, since nearly
all orange juice is processed and/or
shipped from Florida to all regions of the
8
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Figure 4
Private label products and orange juice prices
Percent of "low" Q1 price
Quarterly market prices of orange juice for period ending November 2, 1990
Frozen concentrate Refrigerated













National brand orange 
juice processors are 
very responsive to 
private label competition in
regional markets.country. Further, shipping refrigerated
orange juice is more costly than shipping
FCOJ, which is concentrated in large
part to make long-distance transportation
a cost-effective alternative to establish-
ing a geographically dispersed process-
ing industry. But while it seems logical
to expect that transportation costs and
the subsequent retail prices of orange
juice will increase with the distance
between point of purchase and point of
processing, economists have historically
had difficulty in establishing this fact
(Kaufman and Handy, p. 24).
To examine this issue more closely, we
compared quarterly prices of the six
products in the 10 markets farthest away
from the Florida processing markets (the
“high” group) and for the 10 markets in
and around Florida (the “low” group).
While this comparison does not represent
a vigorous empirical test, it does demon-
strate why many economists have
expressed surprise at the lack of empiri-
cal evidence linking transportation costs
and regional retail food price variability.
For example, figure 6 shows that first-
quarter orange juice prices in the distant
markets were substantially higher for all
three refrigerated products, while the pri-
vate label FCOJ brands had higher prices
in the nearby markets. But that anom-
alous price prevailed only in Q1; in all
subsequent quarters, the private label
FCOJ price was higher in the distant
markets.7 Since FCOJ products are less
costly to ship (in terms of their fresh
equivalent volume), and since processing
9
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Figure 6
Shipping distance and orange juice prices
Percent of "low" Q1 price
Quarterly market prices of orange juice for period ending November 2, 1990
Frozen concentrate Refrigerated

















Private label Brand 2 Brand 1 Private label Brand 2 Brand 1
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Figure 5
Household income and orange juice prices
Percent of "low" Q1 price
Quarterly market prices of orange juice for period ending November 2, 1990
Frozen concentrate Refrigerated













7 On the other hand, the FCOJ price in periods
Q2 to Q4 for Brand 1 differed by less than half
a pennyof these products is more geographically
dispersed than is processing of the refrig-
erated juice products (USDA, 2000a),
the smaller price differences among the
frozen products seen in figure 6 are not
surprising. For the refrigerated products,
the hypothesized transportation price
margins are both evident and substantial:
Brand 1 was 37 percent more expensive
in the distant markets, Brand 2 was 19
percent more expensive, and private
labels were 9 percent more expensive.
Retail price wedges varied by quarter but
remained large in the later quarters.
The substantial price wedges apparently
associated with shipping distances sug-
gest possible answers to two important
questions relevant to this analysis: 
(1) Does the apparent result that trans-
portation costs influence retail
orange juice prices stand up to the
more rigorous statistical tests that
have historically failed to establish
such linkages in food markets?
(2) If transportation margins are signifi-
cant, might other results presented in
this section simply reflect the result
that, for example, high levels of pri-
vate label market shares, integrated
retailing, and retail concentration are
all more advanced in markets in and




We used regression analysis to examine
the evidence of market pricing behavior
discussed in this paper. Although the
technical details of this analysis are out-
side the scope of this discussion, some
empirical conclusions of this analysis are
noteworthy. The regressions show that
the variation of first-quarter prices of the
six products in each of the 54 GMAs
listed in table 1 are largely explained by
the factors discussed in this report and
other related factors.8 More important,
the regression analysis indicates a strong
statistical probability that transportation
margins increase retail prices. Even after
accounting for the effect of transporta-
tion costs on retail prices, the data also
indicated a strong statistical probability
that retail concentration, particularly
through vertical integration of the ware-
house and shipping functions, is associ-
ated with lower retail prices for the
refrigerated orange juice products.9 We
also found a strong statistical association
between high private label market shares
and lower prices for national brands in
the refrigerated orange juice segment.
We found a less compelling result for the
effects of household income on market
prices. While higher household incomes
appeared to lead to higher retail orange
juice prices, the statistical probability
that income and prices are related in this
way was found to be rather low. For the
FCOJ products, many of the qualitative
effects of each criterion found in the
regressions on the refrigerated segment
are replicated, but the statistical signifi-
cance of the findings is not compelling.
Summary
There are far fewer sellers and buyers
along the orange juice supply chain
today than there were only 10 years ago.
This paper presents comparisons of pric-
ing behavior in 1990 between markets
more advanced in the marketing consoli-
dation process and markets far less so.
Our findings indicate that retail orange
juice prices were generally lower in mar-
kets where a few grocery chains con-
trolled large shares of the area grocery
market. We also found lower prices in
markets where large grocery wholesalers
and/or integrated retailers dominated
market sales. Also observed from this
data was an apparent relationship
between private label products in a mar-
ket and lower prices for leading national
orange juice brands. Related to this, we
found that price increases were more
pronounced in areas with strong private
label competition, and this appeared to
reflect smaller cost-to-price margins in
these markets. These smaller margins
meant there was less of a buffer for
retailers or brand producers to hold
prices steady when grower prices in-
creased with the freeze-induced com-
modity shortage. While prices appeared
to be higher in markets where average
household incomes were high, these
findings were less pronounced. Taken
together, the data show how consolida-
tion along the orange juice supply chain,
such as occurred over much of the
1990s, could have contributed to lower
market prices. Also apparent in this data
is some indication that diminished com-
petition, particularly diminished private
label competition, leads to higher market
prices.
Since the period of this analysis, there
has been more widespread consolidation
of grocery retail and wholesale opera-
tions, and private label/store-brand prod-
ucts have flourished. Consumer prefer-
ences have substantially shifted from
frozen to refrigerated juice varieties, and
with this shift, brand market shares have
also changed. So, while it appears that
10
ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
www.ers.usda.gov
8 Additional information for each GMA used in
the regression analysis includes the combined
market share of the top 10 national retailers,
the combined market share of regional brand
orange juice products, a measure of educational
attainment, and an index (developed in a study
by Binkley) of the market area’s responsive-
ness to national advertising.
9 An alternative explanation of these results,
offered by a reviewer of the manuscript, is that
orange juice is often used as a loss leader by
supermarkets where brand competition is high,
which may also be in highly concentrated retail
market areas. A loss leader is a product sold at
or below cost to attract customers to the store.





in the orange juice supply
chain, continuing
consolidation has not
diminished the potential that
anti-competitive forces may
push up retail orange juice
prices in the future.the cost-reducing forces have out-
weighed the anti-competitive forces as
consolidation has advanced in the orange
juice supply chain, continuing consolida-
tion has not diminished the potential that
anti-competitive forces may push up
retail orange juice prices in the future.
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